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IS LIFE THE SAME AS DEATH?:
IMPLICATIONS OF GRAHAM V. FLORIDA,
ROPER V. SIMMONS, AND ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES
FOR JUVENILE AND MENTALLY RETARDED
OFFENDERS
Natalie Pifer*
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's prohibition on executing
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders, life without parole has
become the maximum available sentence for these offenders. However,
an analysis of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence indicates that
life without parole sentences for these groups present many of the same
concerns that led the Court to prohibit executions. While juvenile life
without parole sentences have received much attention from advocacy
groups, legislators, and even the US. Supreme Court-which recently
found unconstitutional juvenile life without parole sentences for non-
homicide crimes-there is a notable absence of any similar movement
on behalf of mentally retarded offenders. This silence is especially
striking in light of the two groups' intertwined death penalty
jurisprudence. This Note explores the constitutional dfficulties
implicated in sentencing these two groups to life without parole in four
parts: (1) comparing the death penalty jurisprudence surrounding
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders; (2) analyzing the recent
Graham v. Florida decision and evaluating whether it can be extended
to support a categorical ban of juvenile life without parole sentences
for homicide-related offenses; (3) exploring the viability of a challenge
to life without parole sentences by mentally retarded offenders; and (4)
seeking to explain the absence of any movement challenging life without
parole sentences by mental retardation advocates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment did not preclude execution of mentally retarded'
offenders by virtue of their mental retardation alone.2 Thirteen years
later, the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue in Atkins v. Virginia.3
After applying society's evolved standards of decency, the Court
reversed its earlier holding, finding in Atkins that executing mentally
retarded offenders violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.' Atkins represented a particular
triumph for advocates of mentally retarded individuals' rights and a
landmark victory for death penalty opponents in general, who hoped
the decision would inspire continued death penalty reform.'
Three years after Atkins, the Court again grappled with the
constitutionality of capital punishment in Roper v. Simmons.6 In
1. While terminology used to describe those individuals with sub-average intellectual
functioning has evolved from "mentally retarded" to a more progressive categorization of either
"mentally disabled" or "intellectually disabled," this Note will use the term "mentally retarded."
This decision is engendered simply by a desire to preserve consistency, given the language used
by the U.S. Supreme Court and legal scholars.
2. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
3. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In criminal punishment discussions, it is tempting to focus only on
the offender. To avoid losing perspective and sight of the victims, a brief summary of the case is
as follows. Daryl Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and murder. Id. at 307.
Atkins and a partner, William Jones, abducted Eric Nesbitt, an airman stationed at Langley Air
Force Base, from a convenience store. Id. at 307, 338. They ordered him to withdraw $200 from a
nearby automated teller machine and drove him to a deserted area. Id. at 338. According to Jones,
who pled guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for his testimony against Atkins, Atkins
ordered Nesbitt out of the car and shot Nesbitt eight times in the thorax, chest, abdomen, arms,
and legs. Id. After Atkins was convicted of capital murder in Virginia, a jury sentenced him to
death, even after hearing evidence that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded with an IQ of fifty-
nine. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 451-53 (Va. 1999). The Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld Atkins's death sentence, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on appeal. Atkins,
536 U.S. at 321.
4. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
5. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, High Court Rules That Executing the
Mentally Retarded Is "Cruel and Unusual" Punishment (June 20, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalretardation/10334prs20020620.html.
6. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). While the Court found capital punishment to be inappropriate,
Christopher Simmons was not innocent. Id at 578. Seventeen-year-old Simmons, along with a
fifteen-year-old accomplice, broke into Shirley Crook's home, entered her bedroom, covered her
eyes and mouth with duct tape, and drove her to a state park where they threw her from a bridge.
Id. at 556. She drowned in the river below. Id. at 557. After police received information of his
involvement, Simmons was arrested and charged as an adult for burglary, kidnapping, stealing,
and murder in the first degree. Id. After convicting him of murder, the jury sentenced Simmons to
death. Id. at 558. After the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins, Simmons filed a new petition for
post-conviction relief, asserting that Atkins established the unconstitutionality of executing a
juvenile offender. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399, 413 (Mo. 2003). The
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Roper, the petitioner contended that the reasoning of Atkins
established that the Constitution also prohibits the execution of
juveniles who were under the age of eighteen when the crime was
committed.' The Court agreed.! After carefully reviewing similarities
to Atkins,' the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders."o Again, death
penalty opponents rejoiced." Atkins had not only inspired further
reform, but it had also provided the necessary impetus for a
successful, categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to capital
punishment sentences for juvenile offenders.12
In the wake of Atkins and Roper, life without parole sentences
have replaced executions for juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders, but this substitution is not without constitutional
difficulties and challenges." Whereas mentally retarded offenders
mounted the first successful categorical challenge to capital
punishment, today's Eighth Amendment challenges have centered on
life without parole challenges involving juvenile offenders. Indeed,
in May 2010, the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
juvenile life without parole for non-homicide crimes.14 The Graham
v. Florida" decision is the first time the Court has ruled an entire
Missouri Supreme Court agreed, resentencing him to life without parole. Id. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's decision, thereby categorically banning the execution of juvenile
offenders. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
7. Id. at 559.
8. Id. at 568; see infra Part II (explaining the analytical similarities between Atkins and
Roper the Court relied on in banning executions of juvenile offenders).
9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-75.
10. Id. at 578. Unless otherwise noted, the term "juvenile offender" refers to an offender
who was under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was committed.
11. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Welcomes Landmark Supreme Court
Ruling Striking Down Death Penalty for Juveniles (Mar. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2004/13928prs20O5030l.html.
12. Previous challenges had only produced a partial ban. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (finding the Constitution does not proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders over the
age of fifteen but under the age of eighteen); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(finding unconstitutional the execution of any offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the
crime).
13. Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form ofDeath: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles
Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 10 (2008).
14. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). The Court declined to decide a
companion case, dismissing it as improvidently granted. Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So. 2d 83 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157, cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010).
15. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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category of punishment-outside of the death penalty-
unconstitutional. While juvenile advocates are already pushing to
extend the Court's reasoning in Graham to offenders serving life
without parole for their roles in killings committed at seventeen or
younger," any parallel challenges on behalf of the mentally retarded
seem to be absent from the Eighth Amendment landscape. This
silence is especially striking when compared to the dynamic and
intertwined evolution of capital punishment jurisprudence involving
these two groups."
In today's criminal justice culture, capital punishment has been
replaced by life without parole sentences for juvenile and mentally
retarded offenders. Like execution, a life without parole sentence
imposes a "terminal, unchangeable, once-and-for-all judgment upon
the whole life of a human being and declares that human being
forever unfit to be a part of civil society."" Accordingly, as Graham
demonstrates, the Court must begin to reevaluate the constitutionality
of sentencing the most vulnerable criminal offenders to life without
parole. This Note explores the constitutional difficulties in
sentencing these two groups of offenders to life without parole
sentences and the viability of any such challenge. Part II describes
the legal similarities between juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders as established in Roper and Atkins, respectively, and
surveys the current life without parole landscape. Part III analyzes
the recent Graham decision and evaluates whether it can be
broadened to support a categorical challenge to life without parole
sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide-related offenses. Part
IV contends that much of Graham's logic can be extended to life
without parole sentences involving mentally retarded offenders.
Finally, Part V evaluates the viability of a categorical challenge by
mentally retarded offenders sentenced to life without parole for non-
homicide offenses and suggests a possible policy explanation for the
silence of mental retardation advocates on life without parole.
16. See Adam Liptack, Justices Limit Life Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2010, at 1.
17. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
18. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. July 16, 2009).
1499Summer 20 10]
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II. THE PAST AND PRESENT LANDSCAPE OF
MAXIMUM PUNISHMENTS FOR JUVENILE AND
MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS
This part has three purposes: (1) it analyzes the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment death penalty precedent; (2) it surveys the
current life without parole statutory landscape and evaluates the
prevalence of life without parole sentences within the criminal
justice system; and (3) it establishes the similar treatment of juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders under the Eighth Amendment. The
first section's importance lies in understanding the Court's Eighth
Amendment precedent that has guided the Graham Court and would
likely control a similar challenge brought by a mentally retarded
offender." The latter sections are critical to properly evaluating a
national-consensus claim regarding life without parole sentences, and
factors relied on by the Court in all of its most recent Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.20 The intersection of these factors will
likely be necessary to a successful categorical Eighth Amendment
challenge to life without parole sentences.21 Furthermore, this part
will illustrate that, more often than not, juvenile and mentally
retarded offenders have received similar treatment by the sentencing
side of the criminal justice system.
A. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prohibiting certain
punishments for certain classes of offenses has remained largely
untouched since Atkins and Roper.22 These cases remain among the
Court's most recent and sweeping Eighth Amendment mandates and
were guideposts for the Court's analysis in Graham.2 3 In order to
19. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991) (discussing the use of precedent
in Supreme Court decisions).
20. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023-26; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
21. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
22. The 2008 Kennedy decision illustrates the Court's continued commitment to: (1) finding
the existence of a national consensus against a particular type of punishment, and (2) the
importance of satisfying the capital punishment justifications of retribution and deterrence. See
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-61 (holding that the statute authorizing the death penalty for the rape
of a child was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
23. While the Court's capital-sentencing jurisprudence has traditionally departed from its
noncapital-sentencing case law in fundamental ways, it was unclear how the Court would
1500
IS LIFE THE SAME AS DEATH?
invalidate life without parole sentences as cruel and unusual
punishment, the criteria set forth in these capital punishment cases
will need to be satisfied. 24 Thus, a careful understanding of the
Court's analysis in Atkins and Roper will provide the appropriate
standard against which to evaluate the validity of a mentally retarded
or juvenile offender's challenge to a life without parole sentence.
Furthermore, reviewing these cases will also establish that juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders are undeniably similar in aspects
crucial to an Eighth Amendment challenge.
1. The Ineffectiveness of Retribution and Deterrence
Atkins and Roper both place significant emphasis on the
difficulty of applying retribution and deterrence rationales to
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders.2 5 Retribution, the
punishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense
committed,2 6 and deterrence, the prevention of criminal behavior by
fear of punishment, 27 have long been among society's goals in
punishing its offenders.2 8 The Court continues to embrace these
philosophical ends, citing the effectiveness of both retribution and
deterrence as the primary legitimate social justification of the death
penalty.29 Thus, if neither retribution nor deterrence is served by
execution, the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. 0
a. Retribution
Retribution demands that the severity of punishment be
dependent on the offender's culpability." In Atkins, the Court found
that mental retardation directly affects a criminal offender's
approach a categorical challenge to life without parole sentences. In Graham, the Court
specifically adopted the analysis used in Roper and Atkins. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
24. See infra note Ill and accompanying text.
25. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (9th ed. 2009).
27. Id. at 514.
28. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 214-20 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2006) (1651) (asserting that the justification of punishment must be utilitarian and
that punishment is by nature retributive).
29. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
30. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
31. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
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culpability.3 2 The clinical definition of mental retardation describes
sub-average intellectual functioning as well as significant limitations
in adaptive skills-such as communication, self-care, and self-
direction-that manifest before the age of eighteen." In turn, these
impairments affect a mentally retarded offender's ability to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others.34 The Atkins Court found these characteristics created a lesser
culpability, inadequate to justify the most severe punishment
available to the State. 35
The argument in Roper was the same as that in Atkins:
diminished culpability renders the case for retribution not "strong"
enough to justify the "law's most severe penalty."" In order to
establish the juvenile offender's diminished culpability, the Court
described three conditions intrinsic to youth, two of which distinctly
echoed those described in Atkins." First, a juvenile's lack of maturity
and undeveloped sense of responsibility often result in "impetuous
and ill-considered actions." 38  Second, a juvenile is "more
vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure."" Third, a juvenile's personality traits are "more
transitory, less fixed" than those of an adult.40 Taken in totality, the
Roper Court concluded that those characteristics combined to
"render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
32. Id.; James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414, 429-32 (1985).
33. John McGee & Frank Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental
Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL
RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (Ronald W. Conley, Ruth Luckasson, & George N. Bouthilet eds.,
1992).
34. Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice-Related Competencies
in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 487-89 (1994).
35. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
36. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
37. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (describing mentally retarded offenders' proclivity to
act according to impulse rather than a premeditated plan and follow rather than lead in group
settings), with Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (describing juvenile offenders' vulnerability to impulsive
decisions, negative influence, and outside pressure).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
39. Id. at 569 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
40. Id. at 570. See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (W.W.
Norton 1968).
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offenders" since the irresponsible conduct of a juvenile is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.4 1 Ultimately, the Court
found the case for retribution not as strong with a juvenile as with an
adult offender.4 2
b. Deterrence
Capital punishment works as an effective deterrent "only when
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation"43 because it is
based upon the assumption that the increased severity of punishment
will prevent people from murdering." However, as with retribution,
the mentally retarded offender has certain cognitive and behavioral
incapacities, such as diminished capabilities to understand and
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses that render the calculus of
deterrence ineffective and execution unjustifiable.45
The Atkins Court reasoned that these characteristics particular to
mentally retarded offenders decrease the likelihood that mentally
retarded individuals can adequately reason that their actions may
lead to their execution and therefore control their conduct based on
that information.46 Since only mentally retarded offenders are
precluded from receiving capital punishment, offenders who can
engage in such analytical reasoning still face the threat of execution,
thereby preserving the greater societal deterrent value of capital
punishment.47
In Roper, the Court concluded that the very same youthful
characteristics that diminished a juvenile offender's culpability such
that retribution was unjustifiable also rendered the deterrence
rationale less effective.48 Similar to how it treated the mentally
retarded offender, the Court treated the possibility that a youthful
offender would engage in any cost-benefit analysis that would attach
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
42. Id at 571.
43. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
44. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
45. Id.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
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weight to the possibility of execution as virtually nonexistent.49 Thus,
as with mentally retarded offenders, executing juveniles furthered no
societal interest in deterrence.
2. A Reduced Capacity to Effectively Demonstrate Mitigation
Mandatory imposition of capital punishment regardless of a
crime's severity is unconstitutional.so Rather, in capital cases, justice
requires that the sentencer consider not only the acts by which the
crime was committed, but also the circumstances of the offense and
the character of the offender. While imposition of a lesser sentence
may not warrant such detailed reflection, the severity of a death
sentence requires a heightened standard of consideration in order to
satisfy the Eighth Amendment's fundamental respect for humanity.52
Without a mandated exploration into possible mitigation during
sentencing, a death sentence may be imposed although other factors
call for a lesser penalty."
The reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders enhances
the risk that capital punishment, rather than a lesser penalty, will be
inflicted. Mentally retarded defendants are more likely to make
false confessions and less likely to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation during sentencing, a combination that the Atkins Court
concluded placed the mentally retarded at a special risk of wrongful
execution.56 The risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite
of factors that may call for a less severe penalty is enhanced not only
by the possibility of false confessions but also by the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors." Mentally retarded defendants may be less able
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression
49. Id. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
50. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976).
51. Pa. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
52. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
53. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
54. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
55. Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 503-04 (2002).
56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
57. Id.
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of lack of remorse for their crimes.5 ' Additionally, mental retardation
may actually work as an aggravating sentencing factor rather than a
mitigating factor, since juries may find mental retardation to be an
indication of future dangerousness." In light of these considerations,
the Atkins Court elected to adopt a categorical ban on the execution
of mentally retarded offenders, finding the risk of wrongful
execution outweighs any societal benefit, especially in light of the
ineffectiveness of retribution and deterrence when it comes to
mentally retarded offenders.60
Significantly, in Roper, the Court's reliance on reduced capacity
to effectively demonstrate mitigation is less prominent than in
Atkins."1 While the Court did not include a separate "reduced
capacity" section in its analysis, as it did in Atkins, it briefly noted
concerns about sentencing mitigation in its analysis in Roper.62 The
Roper Court emphasized the importance of an individualized
evaluation of every crime's circumstances and every offender's
characteristics when assessing the appropriateness of execution.
While the Eighth Amendment requires the consideration of both the
circumstances of a particular offense and the offender's character as
mitigating factors when deciding whether to impose the death
penalty,' the Roper Court feared that even the adoption of a
mandatory rule designed to ensure that youth would not be
overlooked as a mitigating factor during sentencing could not
address the Court's concerns about executions of juvenile
offenders." Further, even if youth's mitigating value was a required
consideration and objectively called for a sentence less than death,
the Court feared it would still be improperly overpowered by other
factors." Just as the very condition of mental retardation may be held
58. Id.
59. Id. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989)).
60. Id. at 318-21.
61. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
62. Id at 572; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
64. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976)).
65. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
66. Id. at 572-73.
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against the mentally retarded offender," the Roper Court feared that
a juvenile defendant's youth could be "counted against him."6
3. A National Consensus
The Eighth Amendment, though unwavering in its elemental
conception as protecting man's dignity, is truly dynamic. What
constitutes excessive punishment today cannot be judged by the
founding fathers' standards. Rather the Eighth Amendment draws
meaning from society's evolving standards of decency. 69 The Court
cannot simply divine these societal standards of decency." Instead, it
must rely on objective evidence of contemporary values as
demonstrated by state and federal legislation."
In Atkins, the Court cited nineteen states that had enacted
legislation that specifically prohibits the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, and at least two additional states that had passed
similar bills in at least one house since the Court first considered the
constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded in Penry v.
Lynaugh.7 2 While not an overwhelming percentage," the Atkins
Court decided it was a trend sufficient to demonstrate an evolved
standard of decency.74 Indeed, rather than sheer numerical force, the
Court placed significance on the consistency of change in the thirteen
years since the Court first considered the issue." The Court also
expanded the objective criteria for evaluating whether a national
consensus exists to include demonstrated practice, noting that even in
states that had no prohibition on executing the mentally retarded the
practice had become exceedingly uncommon."
In Roper, the Court found evidence of a national consensus
against the death penalty for juveniles that was similar to the
67. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989)).
68. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
69. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
70. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
71. Id. at 331.
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
73. This, however, represented a marked increase from the two states and Congress that had
bans against executing mentally retarded offenders when Penry was decided. See Penry, 492 U.S.
at 334.
74. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
75. Id. at 315.
76. Id. at 316.
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evidence the Court found to be demonstrative of a national consensus
in Atkins.7 ' The Roper Court cited eighteen states that had
categorically banned juvenile executions, either by express
legislative provision or by judicial interpretation .7 As in Atkins, the
Court documented the infrequency of actual juvenile execution as
additional evidence of the national consensus." While the rate of
abolition of the death penalty for juveniles was slower than the rate
for the mentally retarded, the Roper Court attributed the pace not to
any consensus in favor of juvenile execution but to an earlier
recognition of its impropriety.so Indeed, when the Court first
considered the constitutionality of juvenile executions in Stanford v.
Kentucky,81 twelve states already prohibited executing any juvenile
under age eighteen, and fifteen states prohibited the execution of any
juvenile under age seventeen.82 Thus, the Court placed the same
weight on the consistency of change demonstrated in Roper,
although slow-moving, as it had placed on the rapid pace of statutory
change demonstrated in Atkins.
4. International Community
While often controversial,8 3 reliance on foreign and international
law in Supreme Court jurisprudence has been commonplace since
the eighteenth century.8 4 Scholars and jurists can debate the propriety
of such reliance, but no one can deny that foreign materials
frequently appear in judicial opinions. Indeed, some of the Supreme
Court's most famous and controversial cases have relied on and
included citations to international materials." In particular, a range of
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 564-65.
80. Id. at 566-67.
81. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
82. Roper, 543 U.S. at 566.
83. See Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American University
Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13,
2005), available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/lD265343BDC2189
785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6EO?OpenDocument.
84. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005) (discussing the early Supreme Court's use of
international laws and views).
85. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130, 149 n.44 (1973); Miranda v.
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Eighth Amendment cases-including Atkins and Roper-include
analyses of foreign sources."
In Atkins, the majority attached a footnote at the end of its
national-consensus analysis incorporating an international
perspective on executing mentally retarded offenders." While the
international perspective was not dispositive, the Court used the fact
that international materials were consistent with domestic legislative
evidence to bolster its finding that a consensus against executing
mentally retarded offenders exists." Additionally, Roper provided a
more extensive and explicit reliance on foreign materials, ultimately
concluding that the almost-unanimous international condemnation of
the juvenile death penalty provided "respected and significant
confirmation" of the Court's finding." In both Atkins and Roper, the
Court relied on foreign materials to buttress its holdings.
B. Life Without Parole
1. Juvenile Life Without Parole Statistics
Forty-two states appear to allow juvenile life without parole
sentences for a wide variety of crimes.o Thirty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government allow life without
parole sentences for certain non-homicide crimes to be imposed on
juveniles." In twenty-seven of those states, a life without parole
sentence "is mandatory for anyone, child or adult, found guilty of
certain enumerated crimes."92 A 2005 study found that there were
2,225 juvenile offenders serving life without parole sentences,
accounting for roughly .02 percent of the total population of
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27, 478 n.46, 488-89 (1966); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555
n.16 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
86. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958)).
87. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
88. Id.
89. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
90. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (2005).
91. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).
92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 90, at 25.
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offenders serving life without parole sentences.9 3 According to a
2008 study, this number increased to 2,484 prisoners serving life
without parole sentences for offenses committed under the age of
eighteen.9 4 This increase is due not to a significant increase in
juvenile life without parole sentences rates, but to improvements in
state data reporting." Of these approximately 2,484 offenders, the
Court's decision in Graham will directly apply to only 129
offenders.9 6
While the United States was once alone in recognizing the
special vulnerabilities of children in the legal system, it stands today
in stark contrast to the international community's prohibition against
life without parole sentences for juveniles." Throughout the rest of
the world, there are no juvenile offenders serving life without parole
sentences." Additionally, the United States' use of juvenile life
without parole sentences is a violation of, or at least raises concern
under, various international agreements to which the United States is
a party. 99 For example, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which oversees and enforces the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, issued the United States a 2006
directive to stop sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole
and review those juveniles already serving such sentences."' This
was necessary because juvenile life without parole sentences violate
93. Id. at 124.
94. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2008, at 2 (2008).
95. Id.; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 90, at 124.
96. Alan Greenblatt, States Soften 'Adult Time for Adult Crimes' Stance, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, May 12, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126928416.
97. In 1899, the state of Illinois was the first government in the world to decide that children
accused of crimes should be tried in a juvenile court that was structured differently from the
regular criminal courts. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 42, 43 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2001); see also Declaration of the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at 19, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess. (Nov. 20, 1959) (adopted
unanimously by the 78 members of the U.N. General Assembly and recognizing that children
need appropriate legal protection by reason of their physical and mental immaturity); infra notes
206-10 and accompanying text.
98. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison:
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 990 (2008).
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 94, at 8-9 (explaining the United States' various
treaty obligations regarding the provision of juvenile legal protections).
100. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States' Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, art. 34, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
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article 24(1) of the Covenant,"o1 to which the United States has been
a party since 1992.102
Further, in 2008, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination-the oversight and enforcement body for the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination-found that the United States' use of juvenile life
without parole sentences, in light of racial disparities, violated the
Convention.0 3 The Committee recommended that the United States
no longer sentence juveniles to life without parole and review any
such sentences already imposed." The United States ratified the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination in 1994."'
2. Mentally Retarded Life Without Parole Statistics
To date, the Supreme Court has ignored the lesser culpability of
mentally retarded offenders in hearing noncapital cases.0 6 Rather
than requiring that mental retardation be considered as either a
complete bar to all extreme punishments, as with Atkins's ban on
capital punishment, or as a mitigating factor, as the Court did in
Penry, the Court has so far left the treatment of mental retardation at
sentencing to the discretion of individual jurisdictions.' 7 In turn,
many states have passed sentencing legislation that recognizes
mental retardation as a mitigating factor or that exempts mentally
retarded defendants from otherwise applicable mandatory minimum
sentences. "o While not direct or categorical prohibitions on life
101. Id.
102. 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. reservations, declarations, and
understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html. While the Senate ratified the Covenant with
five reservations, the reservations do not affect Article 24.
103. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, 21, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008).
104. Id.
105. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
1966 U.S.T. 521, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
106. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1161 (2009).
107. Id.
108. Timothy Cone, Developing the Eighth Amendment for Those "Least Deserving" of
Punishment: Statutory Mandatory Minimums for Non-Capital Offenses Can Be "Cruel and
Unusual" When Imposed on Mentally Retarded Offenders, 34 N.M. L. REv. 35, 44 (2004).
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without parole sentences for mentally retarded offenders, these
statutes can be viewed as an implicit recognition by some states that
life without parole is not always an appropriate or fair punishment
for the mentally retarded."o' While concrete data on the number of
mentally retarded offenders serving life without parole does not
exist, it is likely that there are at least 370.n"o
III. THE PROBLEM WITH LIFE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCING POLICY
This part is twofold. First, it explores the analytical highlights of
the recent Graham decision. Second, it considers whether Graham's
reasoning could be extended to support a categorical challenge to
juvenile life without parole sentences for homicide-related offenses.
Before moving to the specifics of Graham, however, it is worth
noting the analytical methodology adopted by the Court.
In deciding Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges, the
Court has developed two distinct approaches, either of which could
have been applied to Graham's categorical challenge to juvenile life
without parole. In the first, used for challenges to the length of a
term-of-years sentence, the Court considers the circumstances of the
individual case to determine if the sentence is unconstitutionally
excessive."' The second approach, traditionally used only in
categorical challenges to the death penalty, considers the nature of
the offense and the characteristics of the offenders." 2 While it was
originally unclear which analytical approach the Court would take to
109. See id.
110. This number was calculated based on the number of offenders serving life without parole
sentences and the percentage of the population estimated to be mentally retarded. See Adam
Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005
(finding that 28 percent of 132,000 of the nation's inmates serving life are serving life without
parole sentences); Kerry Hall, Life-or-Death Decision Hinges on Nebulous IQ Scores: Claims of
Mental Retardation by Death-Row Inmates May Bring Life Sentences Under N.C. Legislation;
Advocates Say Jurors Should Decide Claims, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 23, 2003, at 4.
("Nationally, the mentally retarded make up 1 percent to 3 percent of the general
population .... ). While this is a rough approximation, it should serve to provide at least some
quantitative anchor to the number of mentally retarded offenders serving life without parole.
111. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). Notable examples of this approach are
found in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), and
Ewing v. California, 583 U.S. 11 (2003).
112. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. Notable cases using this approach include Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
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resolve a categorical challenge to a life without parole sentence,
Graham made clear that Atkins and Roper controlled."' While the
Court provides only cursory justification for its choice of analytical
methodology, the choice comes as little surprise.
Since Atkins and Roper eliminate death penalty sentences for
certain classes of offenders, life without parole sentences effectively
function as the "most severe punishment" available-a phrase used
by the Court in Roper to describe punishments that should be
dispensed with caution." 4 Indeed, the Court in Roper identified life
without parole sentencing as an operable substitute for any residual
deterrent effect capital punishment might have held for juvenile
offenders."' Following this logic, the Eighth Amendment should
apply to categorical challenges to life without parole with the
"special force" demonstrated in Atkins and Roper."' Accordingly, in
order to find juvenile life without parole sentences unconstitutional,
the same analytical factors used in Roper and Atkins must be
addressed.m'
A. Punishment Theory Concerns
Just as in Roper, the Graham Court considered the culpability of
juvenile offenders as part of its inquiry into whether the challenged
sentencing practice served any legitimate penological goals."' Thus,
the juvenile offender's diminished personal culpability is as
important in evaluating life without parole sentences for non-
homicide offenses as it was in Roper's inquiry into the death
penalty." 9 To this end, the Graham Court simply noted that there
was no reason to reconsider Roper's conclusions about the nature of
113. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. Even before the Court's adoption of the analytical
methodology used in Atkins and Roper, there existed strong arguments for reconciling the Court's
divergent approaches, especially for challenges involving juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders. See Barkow, supra note 106, at 1179-82.
114. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
115. Id. at 572.
116. Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988)); see also Jason
Cato & Chris Togneri, U.S. Supreme Court May Alter Juveniles' Life Sentences, PITtSBURGH
TRIB. REv., May 13, 2009 (quoting Michael Sturley, professor and director of the Supreme Court
Clinic at the University of Texas Law School).
117. See supra Part H.A.
118. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
119. See supra notes 36-42, 48-49 and accompanying text.
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juveniles.120 Rather, the Graham Court, using references to recent
psychological and neurological studies,12 1 only confirmed Roper's
findings that juveniles, by virtue of their youth, are less able to
control their impulses, to use reason to guide their behavior, and to
think about the consequences of their conduct than adults. 122
These characteristics served to validate that there are
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult offenders.123 For
example, neurological evidence indicates the brain's frontal lobe,
undeveloped in children, is linked to an individual's capacity to
engage in decision making and to rationally weigh the consequences
of conduct.124 Furthermore, because their frontal lobes function
poorly, juveniles tend to rely on a part of the brain called the
amygdala during decision making. 125 The amygdala is impulsive and
creates immediate emotional responses to situations.126 Accordingly,
juveniles are more likely than adults to react with gut instincts.127
In addition to scientific evidence describing the differences
between juveniles and adults, the legal treatment of juveniles differs
in areas outside of criminal sentencing jurisprudence. Laws at both
state and federal levels recognize juveniles' special vulnerabilities
and their ramifications on the amount of responsibility and protection
juveniles should be given.'2 8 Laws limiting juvenile freedom reflect a
societal understanding that juveniles are not mature enough for a
diverse array of responsibilities.129 These range from the obvious,
such as restrictions upon driver's licenses, 3 0 to the mundane, such as
120. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 38-40, 48-49 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural Development Tangles with
the Juvenile Death Penalty, Sci. NEWS, May 8, 2004, at 299.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 90, at 49.
126. John Matthew Fabian, Forensic Neuropsychological Assessment and Death Penalty
Litigation, CHAMPION, Apr. 2009, at 29.
127. A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL
CULPABILITY 2 (2004) (quoting Dr. Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Harv. Med. Sch.), available at
www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf.
128. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 30.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12509 (West 2010) (stating that no minor under age fifteen
years and six months may hold a learner's permit).
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restrictions upon tattoos.131 Other laws, such as those that impose
enhanced criminal liability on offenders who victimize minors,132
reflect society's judgment that juveniles are especially vulnerable
and in need of legal protections. 33 In particular, criminal statutes that
specifically prohibit the luring or enticing of juveniles for the
purpose of proposing illicit conduct reflect the legal recognition that
juveniles are susceptible to outside negative influences and are
vulnerable.13 4
As established in Roper, these legal protections, together with
the psychological and biological evidence described above, have
direct impact on the Eighth Amendment calculation of personal
culpability.135 As in Roper, this calculation in turn influenced the
Graham Court's inquiry into penological justification for the
challenged sentencing practice.136 While the Constitution does not
mandate the adoption of any particular penological theory,'3 7 the
Court in both Atkins and Roper assessed retribution and deterrence as
the chief concerns of punishment theory when dealing with the law's
most severe penalty.' The Graham Court similarly explored
retribution and deterrence, as well as incapacitation and
rehabilitation, as possible penological justifications for sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without parole for non-homicide offenses.'
While the Court's discussion of incapacitation and rehabilitation is
interesting, this analysis will focus solely on retribution and
deterrence.' 4 0
131. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 948.70 (2009) (a minor age sixteen or younger may not be
tattooed except for medical reasons).
132. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(15) (2009) (making murder a capital offense where
the victim is under fourteen years of age).
133. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 32.
134. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-67 (2009) (making it a crime to entice or lure a child
under the age of sixteen).
135. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 28.
136. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571
(2005).
137. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
138. See supra Part II.A. 1.
139. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
140. This Note proposes that when a life without parole sentence is the maximum sentence
available for a particular group of offenders, incapacitation or rehabilitation alone would be
insufficient to justify the law's most severe sentence. While life without parole sentences
undoubtedly work as effectively as death sentences to segregate juvenile offenders from society,
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Retribution justifies punishing offenders because the sentence
expresses society's condemnation of the crime and seeks to restore
the moral imbalance created by the offense.141 However, these goals
must be tempered by and proportional to the personal culpability of
the offender. 142 Here, the lowered personal culpability of the juvenile
offender becomes critical. As the Graham Court noted, if retribution
does not justify imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders
given their lesser culpability, it is an even weaker justification for
juvenile non-homicide offenders.'43 Simply put, juveniles, by virtue
of their diminished culpability, do not warrant life without parole
sentences when compared to their adult counterparts convicted of the
same crimes.14
Similarly, the deterrence justifications underlying juvenile life
without parole are undercut by a youth's "lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of maturity" and inability to imagine future
consequences for today's actions.'45 This echoes the Court's
determination in Roper that the death penalty was not an effective
deterrent to juvenile offenders since juveniles are unlikely to engage
in any cost-benefit analysis that weighs the cost of their life against
the perceived benefit of any criminal conduct.'46 To contextualize, a
juvenile's perception of the "rest of their lives" is so impaired, many
juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole do not come to
grips with the reality of their sentences until years of incarceration
juveniles' identities are not fixed and young offenders will often mature such that segregation will
no longer be necessary. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. Just as with execution, the inflexibility of
juvenile life without parole sentences overlooks juveniles' capacity to grow. Furthermore, as a
lower court grappling with a life without parole challenge stated, the need to segregate criminals
"does not justify locking up this boy [a thirteen-year-old boy who pled guilty to murder] for his
whole life." Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948 (Nev. 1989). As for rehabilitation, the very
nature of life without parole sentences dismisses the goal altogether. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-
30. Thus, to withstand categorical challenges by juvenile offenders, either deterrence or
retribution must serve as justification for life without parole sentences. Since at least one of these
penological goals is necessary to justify juvenile life without parole for non-homicide crimes,
they alone will be explored.
141. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
142. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
143. Id.
144. Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life
Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REv. 1083, 1108 (2006).
145. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
146. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
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have already passed. 147 Such a delayed realization is particularly
effective to illustrate the virtually nonexistent likelihood that a
juvenile has incorporated the possibility of receiving life without
parole into his decision-making process.148 If a juvenile offender
cannot even comprehend life with parole after years of incarceration,
to expect him to rationalize that possibility prior to offending is to
expect the near impossible. 149 This improbability makes any deterrent
effect virtually nonexistent, echoing the Court's conclusions in
Roper about juveniles and the deterrent value of long-term, future
punishments."' Even if the extremity of life without parole served to
deter a few juvenile offenders, the Graham Court noted that this
limited deterrent effect was insufficient justification, given the
juvenile non-homicide offender's "diminished moral
responsibility."
After finding incapacitation and rehabilitation similarly
insufficient to justify juvenile life without parole sentences for non-
homicide crimes,152 the Court concluded that without adequate
penological justification, the practice was cruel and unusual.' Since
the Court's findings regarding retribution and deterrence seem based
upon Roper's conclusions about the juvenile offender's lowered
personal culpability, extending Graham to cover life without parole
sentences for homicide-related crimes may seem a natural
progression. However, Graham adds an additional inquiry absent
from Roper's analysis: the severity of the offense.'54 While all
147. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 90, at 54 (citing Interview
by Human Rights Watch with Matthew C. (pseudonym) at Colo. State Penitentiary, Cafion City,
Colo., (July 27, 2004) ("I don't think it really sunk in until I'd been in prison for a while and had
some time to look over my case and then I realized, 'man they're trying to keep me here.' You
know what I mean? It kinda sunk in."); Letter from Jacob 0. (pseudonym), Wash. State
Penitentiary, Walla Walla, Wash., to Human Rights Watch (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with Human
Rights Watch) ("In all reality it was not until about the age of twenty-two that I truly understood
[the sentence]. I did not know that this would mean that my whole life was going to be gone. If I
would have known at the time what it all meant I would have tried to take the plea.")).
148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837).
149. See Meghan M. Deerin, The Teen Brain Theory, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2001, at Cl
(stating that at least one researcher has found that teenagers typically have a very short time-
horizon, looking only a few days into the future when making decisions).
150. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
151. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
152. Id at 2029-30
153. Id at 2030.
154. Id at 2026.
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juvenile offenders-regardless of their crimes-may share a
similarly diminished personal culpability, their "moral culpability"
depends not on age, but on offense.' While personal culpability is
determined by way of an offender's age and brain development,'5 6
moral culpability is determined by his crime.'"
Where Roper predicated its analysis of both retribution and
deterrence on a juvenile offender's lowered personal culpability,5
Graham balanced only retribution against personal culpability.' 9 In
contrast, deterrence was juxtaposed with the juvenile offender's
moral responsibility.' Thus, because personal culpability is
determined by age, not by crime, the Court's analysis of retribution
as justification for juvenile life without parole sentences would likely
be unaltered by the offense's increased severity. However, because
the Court has drawn a line between those offenses resulting in death
and those that do not,'6' the Court's deterrence analysis, weighed
against an offender's "moral responsibility,"'62 would almost
certainly be altered by the increased severity of homicide-related
offenses. Thus, it is likely that in a categorical challenge to juvenile
life without parole sentences for homicide-related crimes, the Court
would find that while retribution does not justify such sentences,
deterrence does. The question remains whether deterrence alone
would be enough to justify life without parole.163
B. Evidence ofReduced Capacity
When an offender is subject to the most extreme sentence
available, justice demands that the court consider more than just his
155. Id. at 2027.
156. Id. at 2026.
157. Id. at 2027.
158. See supra notes 36-42, 48-49 and accompanying text.
159. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
160. Id. at 2028-29.
161. Id. at 2027; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2663 (2008).
162. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
163. In this scenario, the Graham Court's analysis of incapacitation and rehabilitation may be
telling. While the incapacitation analysis mentions neither personal culpability nor moral
responsibility, the Court noted that foreclosing the possibility of rehabilitation by sentencing a
juvenile non-homicide offender to life without parole was inappropriate in light of his "limited
moral culpability." Id at 2029-30. Thus, it is possible that in a challenge involving a homicide-
related offense, the Court may find the absence of rehabilitation appropriate. Again, it remains to
be seen if that, together with deterrence, can justify juvenile life without parole sentences.
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crime during sentencing.'" Without this more in-depth review, an
extreme sentence may be imposed when there are factors that call for
a less severe penalty.' The Roper Court grappled with these Eighth
Amendment concerns in the context of the death penalty, focusing on
the distinct possibility that the mitigating value of juvenile offenders'
youth would be overshadowed by the brutality of their crimes.'
Interestingly, the Graham Court does not include any analysis of a
juvenile's reduced capacity to mitigate a severe sentence. 167
However, as in Roper, it is important to note that a juvenile's
reduced capacity to effectively mitigate severe sentences creates
special dangers when it comes to life without parole sentences. With
this in mind, Graham silently helps to alleviate concerns developed
in Roper about a juvenile's ability to effectively navigate the
criminal justice system. The following may also be persuasive in
considering a categorical challenge to juvenile life without parole
sentences for homicide-related crimes.
Besides increasing the risk that juvenile offenders will face more
severe sentences than perhaps appropriate, juvenile characteristics
bear on the risk of wrongful conviction.6 ' The psychological and
neurological characteristics inherent in youth 6 9 raise concerns about
the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings involving
juveniles to a degree intolerable in heightened Eighth Amendment
review."7 For example, the justice system has a serious systemic
concern about the reliability of child witnesses".. that is founded on
evidence showing that children are extremely susceptible to
suggestive questioning techniques like repetition, guided imagery,
164. Pa. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); see also supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text (describing the Eighth Amendment's heightened standard of review in cases
where capital punishment is a possible sentence).
165. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
166. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
167. This absence is perhaps unsurprising given the Court's continued de-emphasis on
mitigation. In Atkins, the Court found a mentally retarded offender's reduced capacity to mitigate
his sentence as a separate justification to categorically ban the execution of such offenders. Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002). In Roper, the difficulties juveniles face in effectively
mitigating their sentences receive a much less distinct treatment. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 573-74 (2005).
168. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 35, 38.
169. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (describing the psychological and
neurological characteristics inherent in youth).
170. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 39.
171. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2663 (2008).
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and selective reinforcement. 7 2 These susceptibilities impact not only
the reliability of child witnesses, but also the reliability of the police
interrogation process, creating a heightened risk that juveniles will
falsely confess. Furthermore, given their tendency to value short-
term benefits over future outcomes, juveniles are more likely to give
inculpatory statements in order to be allowed to leave the police
station.'73 Juveniles are usually quick to comply with and reluctant to
question the wishes of authority figures, increasing juveniles'
susceptibility to police suggestions and interrogation pressures.174
Indeed, of the young adolescents aged twelve to fifteen who have
been exonerated in the United States, 69 percent have confessed
falsely, as compared with 25 percent of teens aged sixteen to
seventeen and 8 percent of adults."
Even after interrogations, juveniles continue to face unique
challenges in the criminal justice system. For example, during an
adult criminal proceeding, the defendant is responsible for making
critical decisions, such as whether to testify, waive a jury trial, or
accept a plea bargain.7 6 However, there exist serious scientific and
sociological doubts regarding the capacity of juveniles to make these
critical legal decisions."' Furthermore, like mentally retarded adults,
juveniles are "less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel
and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.""'
172. See Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific
Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 33, 47-54 (2000).
173. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent
Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 53, 65-66 (2007).
174. See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not
Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 150-52
(2003).
175. Samuel R. Gross, et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989-2003, 95 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 tbl.4 (2005).
176. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1.2(a) (2007).
177. See Thomas Grisso et. al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 333, 356 (2003) (finding that one of every three eleven- to thirteen-year-olds and one of
every five fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds showed impairments in competency that would result in a
mentally ill adult being found incompetent to stand trial); id. at 357 (finding that young
adolescents cannot recognize the risks or consider the long-term consequences of legal decisions);
Thomas Grisso, The Competence ofAdolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. &
L. 3, 11 (1997) (noting that over half of adolescents studied thought judges would penalize
defendants for exercising rights).
178. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 39 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-
21(2002)).
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C. Evidence of a National Consensus
While particularly illustrative of the impropriety of juvenile life
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses, the above
analysis was not the Court's first step in its Eighth Amendment
examination. Rather, as in Atkins and Roper, the Graham Court first
reviewed the objective indicia of national consensus as expressed by
federal and state legislation addressing juvenile life without parole
sentences.179 These statutes work to inform the Court's inquiry into
society's evolving standards of decency.'s Here, the Graham Court
cited that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government allowed the possibility of life without parole for
non-homicide crimes.'"' The Court quickly dismissed that the sheer
number of jurisdictions authorizing juvenile life without parole for
non-homicide crimes alone conclusively demonstrated a national
consensus approving the practice.'82 According to the Court, the
absence of any legislative trend working to ban juvenile life without
parole sentences for non-homicide crimes is a result of transfer laws
and not an indication of legislative approval of the sentencing
practice.'
Since actual statutory authorization of juvenile life without
parole sentences for non-homicide crimes was an unreliable indicator
of the national consensus, the Court focused its analysis on the actual
sentencing practices of the states.'84 Citing that only 109 juvenile
offenders were serving life without parole sentences for non-
homicide offenses, the Court concluded that while a significant
number of jurisdictions allow for the sentence, the infrequency of its
use disclosed a consensus against its use.' While the Court admitted
that the number of juveniles sentenced to life without parole for non-
179. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023-26 (2010).
180. Id. at 2022-23.
181. Id. at 2023.
182. See id. Indeed, had the Court relied on this evidence alone, the Court would almost have
certainly found no national consensus against juvenile life without parole sentences for non-
homicide offenses given the Court's analysis in Atkins and Roper. See supra Part II.A.3.
183. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025-26.
184. Id. at 2023.
185. Id. The Court later noted that this number may not be entirely precise, which may
account for media reports that Graham will directly affect 129 offenders. Id. at 2024; see, e.g.,
Greenblatt, supra note 96.
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homicide crimes may be higher than in past Eighth Amendment
challenges, proportionally, the practice is rare.'
This is perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Graham
Court's decision.' While both Atkins and Roper relied on
demonstrated sentencing practices in evaluating the respective
national consensuses, these findings were supported by a consistent
legislative trend toward banning the sentencing practices at issue.1'
In Graham, the Court affirmatively moved away from relying on
enacted legislation as the "clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values"' and toward actual sentencing
practices.' This analytical shift could have important implications
for a future challenge to juvenile life without parole sentences for
homicide-related offenses.
Among the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
system, there are 2,574 juvenile offenders serving life without parole
sentences.'9 1 While it is unclear exactly how many of these offenders
are serving life without parole for homicide-related offenses, the
number is approximately 2,400.192 Interestingly, between 2005-
when the Court decided Roper-and 2008, nearly 2,900 juveniles
were arrested in connection with murder and non-negligent
manslaughter.193 This means that approximately 82 percent of
186. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024. In comparison to the five mentally retarded offenders
executed in a five-year period cited by the Atkins Court, 109 juvenile offenders does appear high.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). However, when one considers-as the Graham
Court did-that in 2007 alone, some 57,600 juveniles were arrested for aggravated assault; 3,580
for forcible rape; 34,500 for robbery; 81,900 for burglary; 195,700 for drug offenses; and 7,200
for arson, 109 total juveniles serving life without parole for comparable offenses seems very
small. Dept. of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Statistical Briefing
Book, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/ (last visited July 1, 2010).
187. Justice Thomas would agree. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See supra Part II.A.3.
189. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
331 (1989)).
190. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
191. PBS Frontline, Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in the U.S. T 3 (May 21, 2009),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map.html#more.
192. This approximation is based on the Graham Court's statistic that 109 juveniles are
serving life without parole for non-homicide-related offenses as compared to the PBS statistic
that nationwide, some 2,574 juveniles are serving life without parole. While a rough estimate, it
seems in line with other sources. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Justices Bar Life Terms in Some
Juvenile Cases, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 17, 2010, at 1 (noting that more than 2,000 juveniles
are serving life without parole for killing someone).
193. Between 2005 and 2008, according to the federal government's Uniform Crime Reports,
2,872 offenders under the age of eighteen were arrested for murder or non-negligent homicide.
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juveniles arrested for homicide-related offenses received the
maximum available sentence. 194 This percentage would be unlikely to
convince the Court that a national consensus exists against juvenile
life without parole sentences.
While the Court would likely not be persuaded by demonstrated
sentencing practices, it is not the only piece that composes national-
consensus evidence. The Court would likely give weight, as it did in
Atkins and Roper, to the consistent movement of recent legislative
proposals toward the abolition of juvenile life without parole
sentences. "' For example, if passed, the Juvenile Justice
Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009 would deny funding to
states that refuse to offer a parole option to juvenile offenders and
authorize state grants to improve legal representation for youths
facing life sentences."' Further, states have also proposed legislation
that would reduce the impact of juvenile life without parole
sentences."' However, these proposals would be unlikely to persuade
the Court that a national consensus exists against sentencing
juveniles to life without parole for homicide-related crimes.
As compared with the legislative trend that opposed executing
juvenile offenders, there has not yet been a consistent direction of
national change reflected by legislation dealing directly with juvenile
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE UNITED STATES, tbl.32 (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table 32.html; id
(2007), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_32.html; id. (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
cius2006/data/table_32.html; id. (2005), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_32.html.
194. This estimate assumes all arrested juveniles were convicted and all juveniles currently
serving life without parole were sentenced after Roper. While extremely rough, this figure should
still shed some light on the actual incidence of juvenile life without parole sentences for
homicide-related offenses.
195. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315
(2002).
196. Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 2289, 111th Cong.
§§ 3(d)(2), 6(a) (2009).
197. See, e.g., H.B. 4518, Leg. 95th Sess. (Mich. 2009) (proposing a categorical ban on
juvenile life without parole sentences); H.B. 757, Leg. 111th Sess. (Fla. 2009) (providing that a
child fifteen years of age or younger who is sentenced to life or more than ten years in prison is
eligible for parole if (1) the offender has been incarcerated for a minimum period and (2) has not
previously been convicted of or pled nolo contendere to certain violent offenses); S.B 399, 2009-
10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (proposing a procedural mechanism to review the sentence of a
person who was convicted and sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed when the
person was under the age of eighteen, authorize courts to recall that sentence, and impose a new
sentence).
1522
IS LIFE THE SAME AS DEATH?
life without parole sentences.1' Juvenile advocates should press state
legislatures to prohibit juvenile life without parole sentences. This
effort is likely to eventually produce the necessary national
consensus by way of legislative enactments. For example, it is
conceivable that the Court would be persuaded of a national
consensus if fourteen states and Congress were to ban juvenile life
without parole sentences after the Court's ruling in Graham.'99 As
there have already been bills in several states proposing categorical
bans on juvenile life without parole sentences, it may only be a
matter of time before a national consensus indicates the Eighth
Amendment standard has once again evolved.20 0
D. International Community
As in Atkins and Roper,2 01 the Court in Graham found support
for its categorical ban after surveying the sentencing practices of the
international community.20 2 The Court noted that the United States is
the last remaining nation to impose life without parole sentences on
juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.20 3 Interestingly, the
United States appears to be alone in sentencing juveniles to life
without parole sentences, regardless of the nature of the crime.204
While evidence of the international community's attitude toward a
particular sentencing practice is not controlling,205 it is still a valuable
consideration in future challenges by juveniles sentenced to life
without parole for homicide-related crimes-especially if the Court
is divided on the other factors.
In addition to being shunned by every other nation, juvenile life
without parole sentences are banned by international conventions
198. Brianne Ogilvie, Is Life Unfair?: What's Next for Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 293, 306 (2008).
199. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing the evidence of national
consensus relied upon in Atkins as an increase from two states to sixteen states and Congress).
Here, the baseline would be from forty-two states-the number that apparently allows for
juvenile life without parole sentences. Legislative changes in fourteen states and Congress would
represent the same percentage change as relied upon in Atkins.
200. See supra note 197 (noting proposed state legislation banning juvenile life without
parole sentences).
201. See supra Part II.A.4.
202. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
203. Id at 2034.
204. Supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
205. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
Summer 2010] 1523
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol.43:1495
that nearly every member of the world community has signed. 206 For
example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
specifically prohibits life without parole sentences for offenses
committed by persons below the age of eighteen. 20 7 Every member of
the United Nations except the United States and Somalia has adopted
the Convention.20 8 Soon, the United States will likely be the lone
holdout, as Somalia has indicated its intention to adopt the
Convention. 20 9 Further, the United States is the only country that has
opposed a United Nations General Assembly resolution that called
on all countries to abolish juvenile life without parole sentences.210
IV. WHAT ABOUT MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS?
This part proposes that much of the Graham Court's reasoning
can be applied to banning life without parole sentences for mentally
retarded offenders convicted of non-homicide-related offenses.
Assuming the Court follows the Graham methodology in evaluating
life without parole sentences for mentally retarded offenders, the
Court would likely rely on evidence of (1) punishment-theory
concerns, (2) reduced capacity, 21' and (3) a national consensus
indicating evolved standards of decency.2 12
A. Punishment-Theory Concerns
Imposing the maximum available sentence on mentally retarded
offenders raises serious punishment-theory concerns.213 Since the
Court's ruling in Atkins, life without parole sentences have replaced
the death penalty as the maximum possible sentence available for
mentally retarded offenders. If the Court follows the same analytical
206. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 55.
207. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Art. 37(a), U.N. Doc.
AIRES/44/25 (Sept. 1, 1990).
208. Somalia to Join Child Rights Pact: UN, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2009, http://af.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idAFJOE5AJOIT2009112.
209. Id.
210. G.A. Res. 61/146, 1 31(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/146 (Dec. 19, 2006); Voting Record,
Rights of the Child, available at http://www.un.org/ga/61/third/votingrecords/c3116rev1.pdf.
211. While this section was conspicuously absent in Graham, it may be of greater
significance given its prominence in Atkins.
212. There does not appear to be any real evidence of the international community's treatment
of sentencing mentally retarded offenders to life without parole. Since Atkins indicates such
evidence merely lends support and is not dispositive, it will not be examined below.
213. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-22 (2002).
1524
IS LIFE THE SAME AS DEATH?
methodology adopted in Graham, is likely to find that in order to
socially justify imposing these sentences, they must be in line with
the policies underlying deterrence and retribution. 214 Therefore, in
analyzing deterrence and retribution, evidence of the mentally
retarded offender's reduced personal culpability will be important in
evaluating the effectiveness of life without parole sentences.215
Both scientific and legal evidence exist that mentally retarded
offenders have lowered personal culpability. As the Court
established in Atkins, mental retardation impairs an offender's ability
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others. 216 Together, these characteristics create a lesser culpability
that the Court has deemed insufficient to "justify the most extreme
sanction available to the State." 2 17 Furthermore, even outside of
capital punishment jurisprudence, the law treats mentally retarded
offenders differently based on their unique culpability. Wide
varieties of federal and state laws establish special protections for the
mentally retarded 218 and limit their freedoms. 219 Together, these laws
reflect society's view that the mentally retarded are less responsible
than other adults.2 0 These psychological and legal differences work
to diminish the mentally retarded offender's personal culpability.22 1
This, as established in Atkins, directly impacts the fairness of
retribution.2 22
214. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
215. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19.
216. Id. at 318; Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 34, at 487-89.
217. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
218. See, e.g., Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (ensuring the mentally retarded receive the services and support they
need in Employment, Education, Child Care, Health, Housing, Transportation, Recreation, and
Quality Assurance); D.C. CODE § 46-404 (2009) (giving the mentally retarded special ability to
annul a marriage).
219. See, e.g., BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW & NATIONAL DISABILITY
RIGHTS NETWORK, VOTE. IT'S YOUR RIGHT: A GUIDE TO THE VOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES 5-6 (2008) (describing the numerous state laws that affect the voting
rights of the mentally disabled).
220. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 15 (1981) (limiting the
contractual liability of the mentally retarded).
221. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
222. Id. at 319.
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Furthermore, the deterrence justifications for sentencing a
mentally retarded offender to life without parole are undercut by the
same cognitive and behavioral impairments that undermine
retributive justifications.223 Because mentally retarded offenders are
so unlikely to process the possibility of receiving the maximum
punishment, they are unlikely to control their conduct based on that
information.224 Simply put, a mentally retarded offender is less likely
to understand the permanence of a life without parole sentence, let
alone weigh those costs against the perceived benefit of criminal
conduct. 225 This unlikelihood is perhaps even more pronounced than
it is with juveniles. While a juvenile offender may eventually mature
enough to realize the permanence of life without parole years after
receiving a sentence, 226 a mentally retarded offender's intellectual
resources are subnormal through all or most of his development.227
Thus, the mentally retarded offender may never understand the
implications of life without parole, echoing the Court's conclusion in
Atkins about the deterrent value of long-term future punishments.22 8
B. Reduced Capacity
When a defendant faces the most severe punishment available to
the State, the court must consider more than the defendant's crime
during sentencing.2 29 In part, this heightened Eighth Amendment
standard of review prompted the Atkins Court to categorically ban
capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders, fearing that those
defendants' inability to effectively show mitigation in the face of the
most severe sentence would result in wrongful executions. 230 The
223. Id. at 320.
224. Id.
225. Take, for example, Ricky Ray Rector, who, on the night he was scheduled for execution,
put aside his dessert, saying he wanted to save it for the next day. Steve Mills & Andrew Zajac,
Ruling Too Late for 40 Inmates: Some with Low IQ Executed Before High Court's Ban, CHI.
TRIB., June 23, 2002.
226. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
227. JAMES N. BUTCHER ET AL., ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 540 (12th ed. 2003).
228. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
229. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304-05 (1976); Pa. ex rel Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
230. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989))
(describing Atkins's focus on the possibility that mentally retarded defendants would receive a
more severe punishment because of their lesser ability to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation); Cloud et al., supra note 55, at 503-04.
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Atkins Court cited the increased likelihood that a mentally retarded
defendant would make a false confession as well as such a
defendant's decreased ability to give meaningful assistance to
counsel, testify effectively, or show remorse. 231' These factors, as in
Atkins, place mentally retarded defendants at a special risk for
receiving life without parole when a lesser sentence-or perhaps no
sentence at all-is more appropriate.23 2
Mentally retarded offenders, like juveniles, are at a high risk for
wrongful conviction based on false confessions.2 33 Mentally retarded
defendants, however, may be more vulnerable than juveniles during
criminal interrogations. For example, while both juvenile and
mentally retarded defendants are likely to make a waiver of Miranda
rights that is neither voluntary, knowing, nor intelligent, thereby
rendering the confession inadmissible, judges are more willing to
deny the validity of waivers by juveniles than by the mentally
retarded.2 34 Further, while some jurisdictions have adopted a special
rule banning interrogations of juveniles, 235  a similar judicial
protection for mentally retarded suspects is not feasible given the
current criminal justice landscape. While police officers can easily
separate juvenile from adult offenders given the bright-line rule of
age, many police officers cannot recognize when an offender is
mentally retarded.236 This may also explain why most police
departments do not have special protocols for dealing with mentally
retarded suspects.23 7 Recognition by law enforcement is unlikely to
231. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
232. See id. at 321.
233. False confessions are at the root of approximately 25 percent of wrongful convictions. In
approximately 35 percent of the cases where a false confession led to a wrongful conviction, the
defendant was either eighteen years or younger, mentally retarded, or both. The Innocence
Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
351.php (last visited July 30, 2010).
234. Brian Corcoran, "This Has to Be Wrong": Mirandizing the Mentally Challenged, 6 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 629, 630 n.3 (2008).
235. See, e.g., Thomas J. Von Wald, Note, No Questions Asked! State v. Horse: A Proposition
for a Per Se Rule When Interrogating Juveniles, 48 S.D. L. REV. 143, 164-70 (2003).
236. Maura Dolan & Evelyn Larrubia, Telling Police What They Want to Hear, Even If It's
False, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 2 ("[P]olice officers sometimes do 'not really recognize' that
suspects are mentally retarded.") (quoting Morgan Cloud, Professor, Emory University).
237. Id. at 1.
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improve since few states have training programs on the special
problems posed by mentally retarded defendants.2 38
C. Evidence ofNational Consensus
As demonstrated in Atkins, Roper, and Graham, the Court will
only explore evidence of punishment-theory concerns and reduced
capacity if it finds that there is consensus indicating that sentencing
the mentally retarded to life without parole offends society's
evolving standards of decency. 239 Here, there is considerably less
evidence directly signifying society's condemnation of sentencing
mentally retarded offenders to life without parole than there was in
Atkins, Roper, and Graham.2 40 Some statutes recognize mental
retardation as a mitigating factor or exempt mentally retarded
defendants from otherwise applicable mandatory minimum
sentences.24 1 Such statutes may indirectly reflect legislative
recognition that life without parole may not be appropriate for
mentally retarded offenders in all situations.2 42
Additionally, some legislative proposals aimed at juvenile life
without parole sentences would require parole boards to consider the
existence of developmental disabilities when evaluating whether
juvenile offenders' prior life without parole sentences warrant
granting the juveniles new sentencing hearings.243 Such bills have
won the support of some disability rights advocates. 2" However, it is
unlikely the Court would find these examples illustrative of a
national consensus against sentencing mentally retarded offenders to
life without parole.2 45
238. Ronald W. Conley, et al., Introduction to THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS xxi (Conley et al. eds., 1992).
239. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-64 (2005).
240. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (providing examples of recent legislative
proposals that would abolish or limit juvenile life without parole sentences).
241. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Letter from Margaret Johnson, Advocacy Director, Disability Rights
California, to Jose Soloria, Chair, California Assembly Public Safety Committee (June 22, 2009),
available at http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/legislature/legislation/2008-2009/SB_0399_Yee.
htm.
244. Id.
245. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (finding that prohibitions on executing
mentally retarded defendants in two states and the federal system did not constitute a national
consensus).
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Court would find that
sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate "consistency of the
direction of change" or that sentencing mentally retarded defendants
to life without parole is "truly unusual."246 Since these statutes do not
ban life without parole sentences for mentally retarded offenders, and
the frequency of mentally retarded defendants receiving life without
parole sentences is a rough estimate at best,24 7 the Court is unlikely to
find this evidence compelling enough to overcome the small number
of state laws dealing with this issue.
V. AN EVALUATION:
COULD-AND SHOULD-LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
SENTENCES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED
OFFENDERS BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
A constitutional challenge to sentencing mentally retarded
offenders to life without parole for non-homicide crimes presents the
same strengths and weaknesses as a challenge to sentencing juveniles
to life without parole for homicide-related offenses. While there is
strong evidence that sentencing mentally retarded offenders to life
without parole raises the same punishment-theory and reduced-
capacity concerns relied upon in Atkins, evidence of a national
consensus is notably lacking.248 Sufficient time may not have passed
to allow the legislature to enact statutes in response to juvenile life
without parole sentences, and the lack of direct statutory response
dealing categorically with the appropriateness of life without parole
sentences for mentally retarded offenders may also reflect larger
policy concerns surrounding mental retardation.249
Over the past several decades, society's understanding of mental
retardation has undergone a dynamic evolution.250 Thus, it is possible
to understand Atkins as the product of a different era of societal
understanding of mental retardation. While the Court's decision was
handed down after the increase of community living centers and
246. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002) (placing additional emphasis on these
two factors over the number of states banning the execution of mentally retarded defendants).
247. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part IV.
249. Cone, supra note 108, at 44.
250. See generally PATRICIA AINSWORTH & PAMELA BAKER, UNDERSTANDING MENTAL
RETARDATION 53-57 (2004) (describing the evolving treatment of mentally retarded individuals
during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
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special education programs working toward the integration of the
mentally retarded in the 1990s, 2 5 1 it is likely that the state legislators
responsible for providing the national consensus relied on by the
Court in Atkins were cultured, at least to some extent, in the lingering
era of institutionalization symptomatic of 1950s American medical
practice 25 2-either during their own childhoods or by proxy through
their parents' childhood experiences. Atkins's categorical prohibition
may be grounded on the assumption that mentally retarded persons
are too incompetent to be held responsible for their own decisions, an
image many of today's mental retardation advocates strive to
disown.2 53 Indeed, many disability rights advocates were dismayed
by Atkins, not because they were in favor of capital punishment, but
because they believed that finding mentally retarded offenders
ineligible for capital punishment signified that the intellectually
disabled are less human than those still eligible for execution.254
The legislative silence on categorically banning life without
parole sentences for mentally retarded offenders may not be an
indication of society's standards of decency for Eighth Amendment
purposes, but instead an indication of society's evolved conception
of mental retardation. Today, intellectual disability groups advocate
for the rights and full participation of all children and adults with
intellectual and developmental disabilities.255 With this ideology in
mind, advocates face difficulty in reconciling their desire to seek
protection for mentally retarded persons involved in the criminal
justice system with their desire to win equal treatment for the
disabled.25 6
For some disability rights advocates, "it is equally important to
promote the right of all persons to make their own choices and, as a
251. Id.
252. Id
253. See Donald N. Bersoff, The Differing Conceptions of Culpability in Law and
Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 83, 88 (2004) (describing the amicus briefs submitted on the
petitioner's behalf in Atkins as well-intentioned efforts that ultimately served to undermine the
rights of people with mental retardation).
254. Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins the Antithesis or Apotheosis of Anti-Discrimination
Principles?: Sorting Out the Groupwide Effects of Exempting People with Mental Retardation
from the Death Penalty, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2004).
255. The Arc, Mission Statement, http://www.thearc.org/who-we-are/mission-and-values (last
visited July 30, 2010).
256. See Slobogin, supra note 254, at 1101-04 (exploring the different views disability rights
advocates have of Atkins).
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corollary, to be held accountable for those choices"2 57 as it is to
protect mentally retarded persons in the criminal justice system. This
ideological struggle has already been documented in the debate
surrounding mentally retarded persons' ability to waive their
Miranda rights.258 Advocating for the categorical prohibition of life
without parole sentences for mentally retarded defendants may run
counter to this mission by creating a protection at the expense of
other rights.2 59
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's capital punishment jurisprudence regarding juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders is remarkably intertwined. Each
case-from Thompson to Penry to Stanford to Atkins to Roper-has
been an important step in a dynamic evolution that has resulted in
life without parole sentences operating as an effective alternative to
the death penalty for juvenile and mentally retarded offenders. In
doing so, the Court has used analysis that reinforces the frequent
perception that juvenile and mentally retarded offenders share similar
Eighth Amendment interests. This was further perpetuated by
advocacy groups claiming that Atkins, by virtue of the two groups'
similarities, demanded the result in Roper.
Today, life without parole sentences have replaced death as the
maximum sentence available to juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders. Both execution and life without parole sentences
permanently remove an individual from society by placing that
person in a prison to await his or her death, and they present similar
Eighth Amendment concerns. However, as juvenile advocates
celebrate their victory in Graham and plan their next challenge, the
comparative silence on behalf of mentally retarded offenders is
reflective of the differences between the two groups. Thus, while the
Court's decision in Graham may serve as the necessary impetus for
257. Bersoff, supra note 253, at 90.
258. Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Assessing the Capacity of Persons with
Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights: A Jurisprudent Theory Perspective, 28 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 53, 67 (2004).
259. See Bersoff, supra note 253, at 90 ("If we accept the concept of blanket incapacity, we
relegate people with mental retardation to second class citizenship, potentially permitting the
State to abrogate the exercise of such fundamental interests as the right to marry, to have and to
rear one's children, or such everyday entitlements such as to enter into contracts or to make a
will.").
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juvenile advocates to more effectively mobilize state legislatures to
ban juvenile life without parole sentences for all offenses, it will
likely serve a different function for mentally retarded offenders. As
life without parole sentences receive more attention because of
juvenile challenges, advocates working for mental retardation
interests will have to resolve their ideological struggle. Advocates
will have to decide whether to challenge life without parole
sentences-perhaps at the cost of rendering vulnerable other
substantive rights-or remain silent on life without parole at the cost
of judicial protection.
